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INTRODUCTION
n 1988, after working for Allied Signal for a decade, Lucille
Kauffman took medical leave to have breast enlargement surgery
to enhance her appearance and self-esteem.' She told only a few people,
but when she returned to work, her supervisor, Don Butts, whom she had
not told about her surgery, touched her left breast and asked her, "Why
didn't you tell me you were getting new tits? When do I get to see
them?"2 Kauffman complained and Butts was fired.3 After suffering a
nervous breakdown, Kauffman sued Allied Signal, but not Butts, for
sexual harassment. However, Allied Signal was protected from liability
for the harassment because its response to Butts' behavior was "adequate
and effective."4
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for employers to
discriminate against employees based on the employees' race, color, sex,
national origin, or religion.5 However, a problem has arisen in determin-
'Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 180 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1041 (1992).2 1d.
' Id. However, Butts had been rehired as a temporary full-time employee
through a temporary employment service after his original retirement from Allied
Signal, and there is no indication that his employment with the temporary service
was adversely affected by his treatment of Kauffman. Johnson v. University
Surgical Group Assocs., 871 F. Supp. 979, 986 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
' Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 185.
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) [hereinafter"Title VII"]. It has beenheld that
this statute applies to sexual harassment like that which Kauffman experienced.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993) (holding that severe or
pervasive conduct that creates an objectively hostile or abusive work environ-
ment, including conduct that impairs job performance, discourages workers from
remaining on the job, or inhibits career advancement, is actionable under Title
VII); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (holding that sexual
harassment exists and is actionable under Title VII when the harassment results
in a hostile environment).
1303
K34CKY LAW JOURNAL
ing what is included in the definition of "employer. ' 6 In Lucille
Kauffman's case, it is clear that Allied Signal was an employer, but it is
not as clear whether Butts could be included in the definition of employer
and sued in his individual capacity. The United States Supreme Court has
not ruled whether Title VII's "and any agent of such a person" language
allows individuals to be held liable for their behavior, and the lower
federal courts have split on the issue.7 If Lucille Kauffman and similarly
situated people cannot hold the individuals who commit harassing and
discriminatory acts liable, they are left without meaningful recovery under
Title VII. 8 Additionally, there is some question as to whether disallowing
individual liability will effectively deter discrimination and harassment.9
Part I of this Note discusses the statutory scheme of Title VII and its
purposes.'0 Part II examines the split among and within the circuits and
the arguments advanced by each side on the issue of individual liabili-
ty. " In particular, the Note examines Miller v. Maxwell's International,
Inc., 2 the leading case on the subject of individual liability under Title
VII. 3 Finally, Part I argues that courts that find individual liability
under Title VII have the better position in light of the statutory lan-
guage and the purposes behind it. 4 This Note concludes that the goals
of compensation and deterrence are best served by allowing individual
liability, particularly in sexual harassment cases where corporate
employers are often found not liable.'
I. THE REMEDIAL SCHEME OF TITLE VII
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, commonly referred to as Title VII,
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against employees on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 6 With the
6 The statute defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees... and any agent of
such a person... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
See infra notes 37-113 and accompanying text.
s See infra notes 171-95 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 201-24 and accompanying text.
o See infra notes 16-36 and accompanying text.
n See infra notes 37-113 and accompanying text.
12 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
13 See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 114-229 and accompanying text.
's See infra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). The statute provides:
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enactment of Title VII, Congress attempted to mandate a "national policy
of nondiscrimination" in employment. 7 In fact, Title VII has been
called one of the most significant pieces of civil rights legislation
ever enacted by Congress."8 Unfortunately, Title VII has managed to
breed voluminous amounts of interpretive litigation, hindering its
lofty goals.
A large portion of the litigation involves who constitutes an
"employer" for the purposes of the statute. Title VII defines an "employ-
er" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person ... .,9
Two other antidiscrimination statutes, the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"),
contain almost identical definitions of "employer."' As a result, courts
use the same analysis for all three statutes and treat the cases dealing with
the issue of whether the statutes include individual liability interchange-
ably.2
1
The inclusion of the "and any agent of such a person" language has
posed a mystery for courts in their attempt to determine whether
individual liability exists under Title VII. The mystery exists because
"agent" is not defined anywhere in Title VII. The absence of a definition
has prompted one court to wonder why nothing is said in the statute
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
17 110 CONG. REC. 13,169 (1964).
18 Hubert H. Humphrey, Preface to the First Decade of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act: Past Developments and Future Trends, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J. 219
(1976).
'9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
20 The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") defines "employer" as "a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more
employees ... and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A) (Supp.
V 1993). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") defines
"employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
twenty or more employees... The term also means (1) any agent of such a
person." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988).
21 See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-80 (7th
Cir. 1995) (following the example of other courts and using the interpretations
of "employer" under the ADEA, ADA, and Title VII as interchangeable).
1995-96] 1305
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about why "agent" is listed as an "employer" (a "principal") in the first
place.
22
The issue of individual liability under Title VII did not pose too
much of a problem prior to 1991 because until that time the only remedy
available under Title VII was injunctive relief, including reinstatement
and back pay.23 Most courts reasoned that since that was the type of
relief only a corporate employer could provide, individual liability was
completely inappropriate.24
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to allow for compensatory and
punitive damages. 25 This amendment undercut the reasoning of many
courts because compensatory and punitive damages are damages that indi-
viduals, as well as employers, could expect to pay.26 Despite the change
in damages, Congress did not change the definition of "employer" in
1991. However, Congress did make one significant change to Title VII.
Section 1981a does not refer to an action brought against an "employ-
er," but to an action being brought against a "respondent."'27
The United States Supreme Court noted that the decision to amend
the damages provisions "signals a marked change in its conception of the
22 Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 666 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that, although
it makes sense as a matter of statutory construction to hold individual agents
liable, it was not necessaryto decide that issue because the "agent" was not close
enough to being a "true employer").
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
24 See, e.g., Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
that individuals cannot be responsible for back pay); Clanton v. Orleans Parish
Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d 1084, 1099 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding no statutory authority to
hold public officials personally liable for back pay under Title VII).
25 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(l) (Supp. V 1993).
26 See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir.
1993) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (concluding that the majority, in determining that
employees are not individually liable under Title VII, has clouded the decision-
making process under Title VII), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994); Johnson v.
University Surgical Group Assocs., 871 F. Supp. 979, 983 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(declining to follow the holdings of circuits not recognizing Title VII as
permitting suits against individual employees); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire
Co., 858 F. Supp. 802, 805 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (concluding that the inclusion of
compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII is indicative of the statute's
broad remedial purpose and, therefore, individual liability applies).
27 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1993). However, the inclusion of the
term "respondent" adds little to the debate as "respondent" is defined as "an
employer."Id. § 2000e(n) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Consequently, it is necessary
to go back to the statutory definition of employer in § 2000e(b).
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injury redressable by Title VII. 28 Unfortunately, there has been no real
indication from either Congress or the Supreme Court whether such a
marked change in perspective includes permitting individuals to be held
liable for discriminatory or harassing conduct under Title VII.
To make matters even more confusing, in 1991 Congress placed
limitations on the amount of compensatory and punitive damages
available according to the number of the respondent's employees.29
Congress also made clear that compensatory and punitive damages are
limited to instances of unlawful intentional discrimination3 ° and recovery
of punitive damages requires a showing that "the respondent engaged in
a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual."'"
Initially, there was uncertainty as to whether the 1991 amendment
allowed for compensatory and punitive damages only for discrimination
occurring after its effective date of November 21, 1991. This issue was
resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Landgrafv. USI Film
Products,32 which held that compensatory and punitive damages are not
available under Title VII for cases pending on appeal before the effective
date of the 1991 amendment.33 In the court of appeals decision in the
same case, the court explained that it would be unjust to require
employers to pay damages they could not have anticipated. 4 Conse-
quently, the additional damages would constitute "'an additional or
unforeseeable obligation' contrary to the well-settled law before the
amendments." '35 It is also well-settled that the 1991 amendments do not
apply to any conduct occurring before the effective date, regardless of
when the case is brought.36
28 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 n.12 (1992) (holding that
Congress's broadening of damages under Title VII cannot be used in an analysis
of Title VII as it existed before the 1991 amendments).
29 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
I0 1d. § 1981a(a)(1).
3'Id. § 1981a(b)(1).
32 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994). For a general discussion of the retroactivity of
the 1991 amendments, see John M. Husband & Jude Bigg, The Civil Rights Act
of 1991: Expanding Remedies in Employment Discrimination Cases, 21 COLO.
LAW. 881 (1992).
33 Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1488.
3' Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 433 (5th Cir. 1992), aff'd,
114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
31 Id. (quoting Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 721 (1974)).
36 See, ag., Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 227-28 (7th Cir.
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II. THE NInTH CiRcurr's HOLDING IN MILER
v. MAxWELL's ITERAATIONAL AND THE CIRcurr SPLITS
One of the first circuits to hold that there is no individual liability
under Title VII as amended was the Ninth Circuit in Miller v. Maxwell's
International, Inc.37 In fact, Miller is the most frequently cited case on
this issue and is often relied upon by courts holding that individual
liability does not exist under Title VII. 8 Conversely, courts which hold
that individual liability exists under Title VII either severely criticize
Miller or simply do not find it persuasive.39
1992) (concluding that Title VII is not retroactive under the traditional rule that
requires the law to limit its "prohibitions and regulations" to future conduct so that
individuals can "conform their conduct" to the law, rather than punishing them for
conduct "they had no reason to think unlawful."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1641
(1994); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1372 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the 1991 amendments do not apply to claims pending at the time of enactment),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1641 (1994); Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d
1370, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that, when applying the presumption of
nonretroactivity, § 101 of the Act does not apply to pending claims on pre-enactment
conduct); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594,598 (6th Cir.) (holding that since
the legislative history does not indicate an intent to apply the act retroactively, it is to
be applied prospectively), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 827 (1992).
37 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993).
38 See, e.g., Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman and Kaskey, 882 F.
Supp. 1529, 1532 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Carterv. LutheranMedical Ctr., 879 F. Supp.
94, 95 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Breen v. Norwest Bank Minn., 865 F. Supp. 574, 578
(D. Minn. 1994); Redpath v. City of Overland Park, 857 F. Supp. 1448, 1456
n.10 (D. Kan. 1994); Dunham v. City of O'Fallon, No. 4: 93-CV-02677 (GFG),
1994 WL 228598 (E.D. Mo. May 12, 1994); White v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,
No. 4:92-CV-2411 (CEJ), 1994 WL 408382 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 1994); Lowry
v. Clark, 843 F. Supp. 228, 229 (E.D. Ky. 1994).
39 See, e.g, Schallehn v. Central Trust & Say. Bank, 877 F. Supp. 1315,
1333 n.16 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (agreeing with the court in Jendusa v. Cancer
Treatment Ctrs., 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1994), that Miller went too far by
construing Congress's intent to protect small entities to include protecting
individuals from liability); Johnson v. University Surgical Group Assocs., 871
F. Supp. 979, 982 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (refusing to follow the Miller court's
analysis that the statute should be construed to preclude individual liability);
Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1014 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit in Miller for
"seizing" on the intent to protect small business to protect individuals); Bishop
v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 423 (D.N.J. 1994) (declining to follow Miller
and instead considering supervisory employees agents of an employer who may
1308 [Vol. 84
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In Miller, an employee filed sex and age discrimination claims against
six individual defendants in addition to her corporate employer.40 The
court first noted that it was bound by an earlier decision which held that
individuals could not be liable for back pay.4 ' The court then opined
that the purpose of the agent provision was to incorporate respondeat
superior into the statute.42 The court further observed: "The statutory
scheme itself indicates that Congress did not intend to impose individual
liability on employees."43 The court reasoned that the limits to liability
of employers with fifteen or more employees indicated that Congress
intended to avoid burdening small businesses with the costs of litigating
claims." The court felt that "[i]f Congress decided to protect small
entities with limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that
Congress [simultaneously] intended liability to run against individual
employees."4 The court rejected the notion that disallowing individual
liability would promote employee violation of Title VII. Instead, the
court felt that employers wishing to avoid liability would see to it
that employees follow the dictates of Title VII.
4
It is ironic, considering the importance of Miller and how frequently
it is relied upon, that the decision was not unanimous. The dissenting
judge in Miller urged the court to limit its holding by exempting
individuals only from back pay, and expressed her concern that the
"overbroad language [used by the majority] may unnecessarily cloud
also be sued); Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F. Supp. 526, 528
(D.N.H. 1993) (refusing to follow Miller because of the Ninth Circuit's failure
to cite authority for its determination).
40 Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. The plaintiff worked in a restaurant and sued the
chief executive officer of the corporate owner of the restaurant, two general
managers of the restaurant, and three "lower level employees." Id.
41 Padwayv. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Backpay awards
are to be paid by the employer."). The plaintiff asked for compensatory and
punitive damages rather than back pay. Id. at 968. At the time Padway was
decided, damages were not available under Title VII. However,the Miller court
felt that Padway expressed the better rule with respect to Title VII, even as
amended. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
42 Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
4 3 Id.
4Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 588. However, this reasoning is questionable. See infra notes 201-30
and accompanying text. Furthermore, this reasoning ignores the very real
possibility that the employer may be either not liable or unable to satisfy a
judgment. See infra notes 171-95 and accompanying text.
1995-96] 1309
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decisionmaking under the Civil Rights Act of 1991., 47 The dissent
further remarked: "What can be said, and all that should be said, is that
under Title VII prior to its amendment, an employee could not be held
individually liable for back pay.",
41
The Ninth Circuit has clearly decided that there is no individual
liability under Title VII.4 Although almost every other case deciding the
issue cites Miller, the holdings are not always as clear and have created
a split between the circuits. Additionally, more severe splits have
occurred within circuits where a court of appeals has not ruled on the
issue.
A number of the courts of appeals which have held that there is no
individual liability under Title VII have nevertheless held that the
individual can be named as a defendant in his or her "official capaci-
ty." 0 The result is that although the individual is named as an agent of
the larger employer, relief can only be obtained against the larger
employer. One of the first courts to so hold was the Eleventh Circuit in
Busby v. City of Orlando." The court in Busby found that individual
'4 Miller, 991 F.2d at 589 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
48 Id. Interestingly, all the behavior of which the plaintiff complained
occurred prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, where compensatory and punitive
damages were first allowed. In fact, Miller was argued and submitted to the court
of appeals on November 8, 1991, before the 1991 amendment became effective,
and it was not decided until April 19, 1993. In light of the fact that the 1991
amendment does not apply to conduct occurring before November 21, 1991, see
supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text, it seems that the court in Miller could
have relied solely upon the holding in Padway and avoided a decision on
whether to allow individual liability under the 1991 amendment.
49 The court in Miller held that "Miller's claims against the defendants in
their individual capacities were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim."
Id. at 588. The Ninth Circuit has never disturbed Miller's holding of no
individual liability under Title VII.
50 See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text; see also Thanning v.
Gulotta, 898 F. Supp. 134, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that there is no
individual liability under the ADEA, but individuals can be named as defendants
in their official capacities); Leykis v. NYP Holding, 899 F. Supp. 986, 990
(E.D.N.Y. 1995); Coraggio v. Time Inc., No. 94-CIV-5429 (MBM), 1995 WL
242047, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1995); Romand v. Zimmerman, 881 F. Supp.
806, 812 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
51 931 F.2d 764, 772 (1lth Cir. 1991) (holding that claims must be made
against public officials in their official capacities). Busby was decided before
Miller and before the 1991 amendment took effect. However, the Eleventh
Circuit later followed Busby in Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (1 lth Cir.
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capacity suits under Title VII were "inappropriate" and that the proper
method for recovery was a suit against the employer - either directly or
by naming the supervisory employee as an agent of the employer.52
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
although admitting that a construction which imposes individual liability
is "facially plausible," agreed with Miller that the purpose of including
the agent provision was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into
the statute. The court then cited Busby and said that a supervisory
employee may be joined as a defendant, but only as an agent of the
employer, who is alone liable for the violation. 4
In Harvey v. Blake,55 the Fifth Circuit found that immediate
supervisors could be "employers" when they were delegated an employ-
er's "traditional rights."56 Nevertheless, the court went on to hold that
the individual defendant, despite being an "employer," could only be
liable in her official capacity.57 The Fifth Circuit later upheld the lack
of individual liability in Grant v. Lone Star Co."8 There, the court held
that individual liability is only imposed upon an individual who meets the
statutory definition of "employer."5 9 In Garcia v. ElfAtochem North
America,60 the court cited Grant for the proposition that Title VII
liability only attaches to individuals acting in their official capacity.6 '
Although Grant and Garcia are the latest holdings from the Fifth Circuit
on this issue, both cases involved conduct that occurred before the
effective date of the 1991 amendment.62
1995).
-2 Busby, 931 F.2d at 772.
" Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that when an
individual is sued in his or her official capacity, the claim merges into a claim
against the larger employer and the individual is properly dismissed), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995).
54 Id.
.s 913 F.2d 226, 227 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that since the individual's
liability was based on her role as an agent of the city, she can only be liable in
her official capacity).
56 Id. at 227. The court said that such rights include hiring and firing. Id.
57 Id.
58 21 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
59
.1d.
60 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
61 Id. at 451. Although the complaint did not make clear whether the
individual defendants were sued in their individual or official capacities, the
court assumed that they were sued in their official capacities. Id. at 451 n.2.
62 Garcia, 28 F.3d at 450; Grant, 21 F.3d at 653. See also Zatarain v.
TrILE VII 13111995-961
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Most recently, in Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.,63
the Third Circuit has considered the issue of individual liability. In
Sheridan, a hotel restaurant employee filed suit against her corporate
employer and the hotel general manager under Title VII, alleging sex
discrimination and retaliation.' The district court dismissed the claims
against the manager based on the absence of individual liability under
Title VII.65 The Third Circuit panel recognized that "reasonable argu-
ments" in favor of individual liability could be made, but elected to
"follow the great weight of authority from other courts of appeals and
hold that an employee cannot be sued."" The full Third Circuit,
however, vacated the panel's decision and scheduled the case for
rehearing en banc.67
Another recent decision from a court of appeals on the issue of
individual liability came from the Second Circuit in Tomka v. Seiler
Corp.6" The plaintiff sued the individuals for various instances of sexual
harassment, culminating in a rape." The court held that the remedial
provisions of Title VII show that Congress never intended individual
liability. 70
The Seventh Circuit first reached the question of individual liability
in EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations.71 In that case, the plaintiff sued
his employer and its sole shareholder under the ADA, claiming that she
fired him because he had lung cancer.72 The court found that there was
no individual liability under the ADA for individuals who do not
independently meet the statutory definition of "employer."' The court
noted that although its holding only applies directly to the ADA, it affects
WDSU-Television, 881 F. Supp. 240, 245 (E.D. La. 1995) (holding that
although Grant involved pre-1991 behavior, the Grant analysis is still applica-
ble).
63 74 F.3d 1439 (3d Cir.), withdrawn, vacated, and reh "g en banc granted,
74 F.3d 1459 (3d Cir. 1996).
MId. at 1443.
65 Id. at 1452.
66 Id. at 1454.
67 Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 74 F.3d 1459, 1459 (3d Cir.
1996).
68 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995).
69 Id. at 1301-02.
70 Id. at 1314.
71 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).
72 Id. at 1279.
73 ld.
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the resolution of the similar question under Title VII and the ADEA 4
In fact, the Seventh Circuit later applied the ruling in AIC Security
directly to Title VII in Williams v. Banning." In Williams, a secretary
sued only her supervisor under Title VII for harassment consisting of
unwanted physical contact.76
Despite the holding in AIC Security, a district court in the Seventh
Circuit allowed an individual to be sued under Title VII under an "alter
ego" theory in Curcio v. Chinn Enterprises, Inc." The four plaintiffs
were restaurant employees and filed suit against their corporate employer
and the individual who was the president and controlling shareholder.78
The court denied the individual defendant's motion to dismiss because he
was "more than a mere supervisor, but was in all respects the actual
employer. "
79
While the Eighth Circuit has not ruled on the issue of individual
supervisor liability under any of the federal discrimination statutes, it has
indicated the direction it would take if faced with the question. The
Eighth Circuit has refused to find individual liability against coworkers
because "liability under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) can attach only to
74 Id. at 1282 n.10.
75 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995).
76 Id. at 552-53. The plaintiff did not sue the corporate employer because,
as the court noted, the employer "investigated promptly and took swift' and
decisive action." Id. at 555. An additional reason was likely the fact that the
plaintiff continued to work for the corporate employer. Id. at 553.
77 887 F. Supp. 190 (N.D Ill. 1995). The decision came after the Seventh
Circuit's holding in AIC Security, but before its ruling in Williams.
78 Id. at 191-92.
71 Id. at 193-94. The court noted that the Seventh Circuit's holding in AMC
Security did not expressly address the "alter ego" theory. Id. at 193. However,
the Seventh Circuit did express an inclination to reject the "alter ego" argument.
AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282 n. 11. The Curcio court dismissed this as dictum
and followed its own holding allowing liability under the "alter ego" theory set
forth in Fabiszak v. Will County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 94 C 1517, 1994 WL
698509, at *2-3 (N.D. Il. Nov. 28, 1994). Curcio, 887 F. Supp. at 193-94.
Although Williams did not mention the "alter ego" argument, another district
court felt that Curcio would have been decided differently if the court had the
benefit of the Williams decision. Coulter v. Irmco Properties and Management
Corp., No. 94 C 7480, 1996 WL 111897, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 1996).
The Coulter court declared that AIC Security and Williams "completely foreclose
individual liability under Title VII, regardless of the particular facts presented in
any given case." Id. at *2.
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employers."" ° Furthermore, the court in Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of
Technology8 was faced with a similar question, it found no liability
under the Missouri Human Rights Act. 2
The Fourth Circuit was one of the earliest courts to hold that an
individual can qualify as an "employer" for the purposes of Title VII in
Paroline v. Unisys Corp.83 In Paroline, the court held that an individual
qualifies as an "employer" for the purposes of Title VII if "he or she
serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over the
plaintiffs hiring, firing or conditions of employment."84 However, in
Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., the court refused to find individual
liability under the ADEA"
80 Smith v. St. Bernards Medical Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that when the only individuals sued were four former coworkers and the
plaintiff was only seeking reinstatement, the individuals were properly dis-
missed). At least one district court in the Eighth Circuit does not read Smith as
a holding on the issue of individual liability for supervisory employees.
Schallehnv. Central Trust & Say. Bank, 877 F. Supp. 1315, 1329-30 (N.D. Iowa
1995) (finding that although Smith presented a similar issue, it is not controlling
because the court was not faced with the issue of supervisory employees).
81 55 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Title VII analysis to a state
statute and finding no individual liability).
82 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.010(6) (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1996). The court
in Lenhardt found the definition of "employer" to be sufficiently analogous to
the Title VII definition to apply the same analysis. Lenhardt, 55 F.3d at 380.
83 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27
(1990).
84 Id. at 104. The court further held that the supervisor need not have
ultimate authority to hire or fire to be an employer and an employee may
exercise supervisory authority for Title VII purposes even if another person is
designated as the plaintiff's supervisor. Id.
85 Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510-11 (4th Cir.) (finding
no individual liability for discrimination under the ADEA), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct
666 (1994). It has been suggested that Birkbeck is the law of the Fourth Circuit,
except for sexual harassment cases, where Paroline may still be viable. Howard v.
Board of Educ., 876 F. Supp. 959, 970 n.8 (N.D. IM. 1995). This may be a fair
reading of Birkbeck in light of its statement that an employee is not shielded as an
agent in all circumstances and that the case only addresses "personnel decisions of a
plainly delegable character." Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510 n.1. In fact, one district court
in the Fourth Circuit found a "distinction between the relatively benign age
discrimination and more egregious sexual harassment" Frye v. Virginia Transformer
Corp., No. CIV.A.95-0399-R, 1995 WL 810018, at *2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 29, 1995).
The Frye court found that Birkbeck was not applicable to sexual harassment cases
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The state of the law on this issue in the Tenth Circuit is far from
clear.8 6 In Sauers v. Salt Lake County,87 the Tenth Circuit held that
individual capacity suits are inappropriate under Title VII 88 However,
just six months later, the court in Brownlee v. Lear Siegler Management
Services Corp.9 held that "a principal's status as an employer can be
attributed to its agent to make the agent statutorily liable for his own
age-discriminatory conduct."90 The court in Ball v. Renner seized upon
that apparent inconsistency to criticize the reasoning of the Miller
court.9 Yet, the court stopped short of finding individual liability under
Title VII because there were insufficient allegations that the defendant
was the plaintiffs supervisor.92
The Sixth Circuit has not ruled directly on the issue of individual
liability under Title VII. 93 The closest the Sixth Circuit has come to
ruling on the issue is dictum from Jones v. Continental Corp.9 4 In Jones,
the plaintiff alleged race and sex discrimination against both her employer
and some individual employees. 95 After the plaintiff lost her case on the
merits,96 the court assessed attorneys' fees and costs against the plain-
tiff97 and attorneys' fees against plaintiffs counsel for "unreasonably
and vexatiously multiplying the litigation."98 One of the grounds for
because "Paroline holds that individual Title VII liability arises where sexual
harassment is conducted by the supervisor for his own benefit and not for that of his
employer." Id. In allowing individual liability for sexual harassment in Frye, the court
overruled one of its own decisions. Id.
86 Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he waters [in the
Tenth Circuit] are not entirely clear.").
87 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
88 Id. at 1125. However, the court did hold that individuals may be sued
under Title VII in their official capacities. Id.
89 15 F.3d 976 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2743 (1994).
90 Id. at 978.
"' Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 667-68 (10th Cir. 1995).
92 Id. at 668.
' Wilson v. Nutt, 69 F.3d 538, 1995 WL 638298, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 30,
1995) ("The Sixth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, and we need not
do so in this case.").
94 789 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1986).
95 Id. at 1227-28.
96 Id. at 1228. The Court of Appeals previously affirmed this judgment on
the merits. Id.
" Id. Attorneys' fees may be assessed against the losing party under 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988).
98 Id.
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granting fees against plaintiff's counsel was the "failure to specify under
which statute the individual defendants (as opposed to the employer) were
being sued."99 In reversing the grant of fees against counsel, the court
said: "Similarly the law is clear that individuals may be held liable...
as 'agents' of an employer under Title VII.9'' 0
Despite this rather strong statement from the court of appeals,
subsequent district court rulings from the Sixth Circuit have largely
ignored the implication of Jones and held that there is no individual
liability under Title VII,"° presumably because the implication in Jones
was not central to the holding of the case. On the other hand, one district
court conducted a more thorough analysis of Sixth Circuit decisions and
found individual liability.'02 The court, although recognizing that the
holding in Jones was mere dicta, found it to be the strongest available
assertion of the Sixth Circuit's position.'0 3 However, another district
court in the Sixth Circuit also did a more thorough analysis and reached
the conclusion that the Sixth Circuit cases "support the proposition that
individuals may only be found liable under Title VII in their official
capacity and not their individual capacity."''
4
991Id. at 1231.
oo Id. Some courts have read this statement as a direct holding that the Sixth
Circuit recognizes individual liability under Title VII. See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC
Sec. Investigations, 55 F.3d 1276, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1995); Ball v. Renner, 54
F.3d 664, 666 (10th Cir. 1995); Schallehnv. Central Trust & Sav. Bank, 877 F.
Supp. 1315, 1329 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 858
F. Supp. 802, 805 (C.D. Ill. 1994); Vodde v. Indiana Mich. Power Co., 852 F.
Supp. 676, 678-79 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Johnson v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co.,
844 F. Supp. 466, 468 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
'o See, e.g., Bremiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric Inst., 879 F. Supp. 782, 787
(N.D. Ohio 1995) (failing to mention Jones); Wilson v. Wayne County, 856 F.
Supp. 1254, 1262 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (dismissing Jones as only determining
whether it was "unreasonable and vexatious" to sue an individual defendant);
Lowry v. Clark, 843 F. Supp. 228, 230-31 (E.D. Ky. 1994) (failing to mention
Jones).
102 Johnson v. University Surgical Group Assocs., 871 F. Supp. 979, 983-85
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (believing that although the Sixth Circuit favors individual
liability, the court should conduct its own analysis of the question in the absence
of a definitive holding from the Sixth Circuit).
103 Id. at 984.
"a Shpargel v. Stage & Co., 914 F. Supp. 1468, 1478 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
The Shpargel court examined the Sixth Circuit's holdings in Jones and York v.
Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1982) (reviewing Title
VII cases and suggesting that an agent could be sued in his or her official
[Vol. 841316
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The Sixth Circuit has not taken the opportunity to directly address the
imposition of individual liability to which it alluded in Jones. The issue
came before it in the recent case of Wilson v. Nutt,' but the court
avoided the issue by holding that the defendant, a county sheriff, could
be sued in his "official capacity."'
10 6
The First Circuit has received no guidance from its court of
appeals and has an intracircuit split. In the First Circuit, the major
case is Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp."0 7 The plaintiff believed
she had been wrongfully discharged because she had claimed to have
more experience and seniority than the two male employees who had
been retained.'08 The court criticized the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Miller and said the plain language of the statute "clearly impose[s]
individual liability upon 'any agent of an 'employer.' 09 The court's
reasoning in Larimande was persuasive and was relied upon in the
absence of a First Circuit holding in Douglas v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. "I However, the reasoning of the Miller court was also persuasive
to at least one district court in the First Circuit. In Hernandez Torres
v. Intercontinental Trading,"' the plaintiff claimed he was harassed
because of his religious beliefs,' 2 and the court found that Title VII
"neither intends nor effectuates the imposition of individual liabili-
ty.19113
capacity).
'o 69 F.3d 538, 1995 WL 638298 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1995). The district court
had dismissed the action because "Title VII does not permit suits against
individual defendants in their 'individual capacities."' Wilson v. Wayne County,
856 F. Supp. 1254, 1265 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
106 Wilson v. Nutt, 1995 WL 638298, at *2.
107 834 F. Supp. 526 (D.N.H. 1993) (holding that Title VII allows for
individual liability).
108 Id. at 527.
"o Id. at 529. In criticizing Miller, the court observed that Miller cited no
authority for its conclusion that § 2000e(b) was intended to protect individuals.
Id. at 528.
"o 855 F. Supp. 518, 520 (D.N.H. 1994) ("Absent a First Circuit case
defining the term employer, this Court has found Lamirande persua-
sive.").
"I No. 94-1057 (HL), 1994 WL 752591, at *6 (D.P.R. Dec. 22, 1994)
(following the "primary reasoning of most courts").
112 Id. at *1.
113 Id. at *6.
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III. TITLE VII DOES ALLOW FOR
THE IMPOSITION OF INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
A. A Strict Reading of the Statute Is Appropriate and Allows
Individuals to Be Held Liable
The first rule of statutory analysis is that courts should begin with
the plain language of the statute, which is ordinarily dispositive." 4 In
fact, the general rule of statutory construction is that courts should
defer to the plain meaning of the statute's language unless there is a
"clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary."' 5 Unfortunate-
ly, "[p]lain meaning, like beauty, is sometimes in the eye of the behold-
er.","1
6
The plain language of § 2000e(b) states that an employer is defined
as a "person... who has fifteen or more employees.., and any agent
of such a person. .... "'" A number of courts have relied on this plain
language in holding that individual liability is imposed under Title
VII' 8 For example, in Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Centers. Inc.,"9
the court said: "By incorporating 'agents' within the definition of
'employers,' the plain language of the statute appears to subject
individuals to liability for engaging in unlawful employment discrimina-
tion."'O2 As was noted in Schallehn v. Central Trust & Savings
Bank,' individual liability is imposed under the statute only when two
conditions are met: (1) when the individual is an "agent" of the employer,
and (2) when the employer already falls within the statutory definition of
"employer" by virtue of the number of employees it has."
"4 Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
'. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
108 (1980).
116 Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
118 See, e.g., Schallehn v. Central Trust & Say. Bank, 877 F. Supp. 1315,
1333 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416,423 (D.N.L
1994); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 858 F. Supp. 802, 805 (C.D. Ill.
1994); Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F. Supp. 526, 529 (D.N.H.
1993).
"9 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
121 Id. at 1010.
121 877 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
122 Id. at 1333.
1318 [Vol. 84
TrrLE VII
The fact that Congress included the agent provision in its definition
of "employer" is significant."z One court that found no individual
liability under Title VII even observed that the statutory definition of
"employer" is broader than the word's ordinary and natural meaning." 4
Another court focused on the inclusion of the conjunctive "and"
rather than the disjunctive "or" in finding that Title VII does not allow
for individual liability.'25 The court observed that if Congress had said
or "any agent of such a person," the language could stand alone and
would allow for individual liability, but that the use of the word "and"
ties the agent provision to the previous language, suggesting that it was
not intended to stand alone. 26 This court placed too much emphasis
upon one word without considering the broader purposes and intent of the
statute. 1
27
As an exception to the plain meaning rule, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized the need to look beyond the usual meaning when
a literal application would produce a result at odds with the intentions of
Congress. 2 Although a number of courts have interpreted individual
liability under Title VII to be at odds with the intentions of Congress,
those courts have arguably misinterpreted Congress's intentions in passing
Title VII.1
29
Finally, Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes are strongly
remedial in nature. It is a principle of construction that such statutes,
because of that remedial nature, should be construed liberally to give
full effect to their remedial purposes. 30 In fact, in Armbruster v.
" Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 858 F. Supp. 802, 806 (C.D. Ill.
1994). Courts finding no individual liability argue that the inclusion is to
incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute. See infra notes 150-63
and accompanying text.
24 United States ax rel. Lamar v. Burke, 894 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D. Mo.
1995).
'" Johnson v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 844 F. Supp. 466, 469 (N.D.
Ind. 1994).
126 Id. at 469.
127 In fact, the Johnson court recognized the warning of its court of appeals
"not to rely too heavily on disjunctive form versus conjunctive form when
deciding difficult issues. Id. (citing Kelly v. WaucondaPark Dist., 801 F.2d 269,
270 n.1 (7th Cir. 1986)).
128 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982).
129 See infra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir.
1994) (giving a liberal construction to the phrase "any agent"); Harvey v. Blake,
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Quinn,' the court gave a broad interpretation to the definition of
"employer" in Title VII to find that parent and subsidiary corporations
could be considered a "single employer" so as to allow the plaintiffs to
meet the statutory minimum number of employees. 3 2 The court further
noted that Title VII "defines 'employer' with substantial breadth and
generality.' 1 33 The court concluded that when Congress amended Title
VII in 1972 to lower the statutory minimum from twenty-five to fifteen
employees, it broadened the reach of Title VII and consequently intended
all of Title VII to be "broadly construed."1 34
B. Congressional Intent Does Not Eliminate the Imposition of
Individual Liability
One of the most frequently advanced arguments for not allowing
individual liability under Title VII is that by limiting liability to
employers of more than fourteen employees, Congress intended to protect
small entities and an individual is the smallest entity of all.' 35 The court
in Miller said: "If Congress decided to protect small entities with limited
resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to
allow civil liability to run against individual employees.' 36
However, the legislative history of Title VII indicates a desire to
protect small businesses, rather than small entities. One court has noted:
"A fair reading of Title VII's legislative history suggests that the
913 F.2d 226, 227 (5th Cir. 1990) (according liberal construction to all Title VII
provisions); Schallebnv. Central Trust & Sav. Bank, 877 F. Supp. 1315, 1332-33
(N.D. Iowa 1995) (requiring liberal construction because of the remedial nature
of antidiscrimination statutes).
3' 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
132 Id. at 1336.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1336-37.
135 See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding that a logical inference from the Congressional protection of small
entities is the protection of individuals); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 55
F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995) (individual liability contrary to Congressional
intention to balance between protecting small business and ending discrimina-
tion).
136 Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. At least two courts have aptly noted that Miller
cited no authority for this proposition. Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs., 868
F. Supp. 1006, 1013 n. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Larimandev. Resolution Trust Corp.,
834 F. Supp. 526, 528 (D.N.H. 1993).
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definition of 'employer' was limited.., not simply, or even predomi-
nately, out of a concern for... litigation costs... but also to limit the
federal government's intrusive reach into the associational rights of small
employers."' 37 Many of the remarks made by members of Congress in
debating where to place the size limitation on the definition of employer
support that interpretation. a8 An additional justification for limiting the
size of the employer may have been to avoid overwhelming small
employers with administrative expenses.'39 Furthermore, when Title VII
was enacted, small businesses made up ninety-two percent of the
country's employers and Congress justifiably wanted to protect that large
sector of the national economy.
4 0
Courts finding individual liability under Title VII have seized upon
this legislative history to demonstrate that Congress intended to protect
very small employers for reasons extending beyond their size or their
available resources and that those same policies do not apply to individu-
als.' 4' One court countered the argument that Congress intended to
protect small family-run businesses by stating that "Congress ...
excluded a category of employers on the basis of their size - 'small
entities' - and not on the basis of whether a business was family-
run.' 42 This argument ignores the fact that limiting the definition of
employer by size is the best way to protect the small, family-run
business. If Congress had expressly excluded "family-owned" or
137 Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1013.
138 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 13,085-86 (1964) (statement of Sen. Norris
Cotton) (the personal relationship in small businesses is predominant and such
employers should be able to "pick and choose employees congenial" to
themselves); 118 CONG. Rc. 3171 (1972) (statement of Sen. Samuel J. Ervin)
(when employers get below a certain size most of the hiring is done by
employing friends).
139 118 CoNG. REc. 2410 (1972) (statement of Sen. Paul J. Fannin) ("Men
and women who are very able and eager to run small businesses find that they
are overwhelmed by paperwork and regulations and redtape.").
140 Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1014-15 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 13088 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey)).
141 See, e.g., Schallelm v. Central Trust & Say. Bank, 877 F. Supp. 1315,
1334 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (holding that the policy considerations for protecting
small businesses do not apply to individuals); Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F.
Supp. 416, 423 (D.N.J. 1994) (finding that the policies underlying individual
liability differ from the policies underlying protection of small employers).
142 Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1524
n.12 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
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"family-run" businesses, it would have also exempted employers that,
although family-owned or ran, have become so large as to lose their
"family quality."
When Congress provided for compensatory and punitive damages
under Title VII, it placed limits, according to the size of the employer,
on the damages allowable. 4 A number of courts have seized upon the
omission of a cap for individuals to conclude that individual liability was
not contemplated by Congress.'" The court in Miller found that
because "Congress specifically limited the damages available depending
upon the size of the respondent employer," it could not have intended
individual liability under this section.'45 However, this assumes that
only employers are "respondents" when the definition of "respondent"
includes "employer"' 46 and the definition of "employer" includes
agents of those with fifteen or more employees. 47 As one court pointed
out, the Miller analysis in this respect begs the question: "It is just as
logical to assume that the statute caps damages against employers of
certain sizes and their agents, while exempting smaller employers and
their agents."'1
48
Furthermore, allowing individual liability does not make the statutory
damages caps unworkable. The maximum amount of compensatory and
punitive damages which each plaintiff can collect is clear from the
statutory language. The only possible difficulty would arise when a. court
had to apportion damages between the individual defendant and the
institutional employer, but that problem is not unknown to courts or
unique to Title VII claims, and it should not form the basis for rejecting
individual liability.
49
14 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
144 See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir.
1995) (cap omission implies no Congressional intent for individual liability);
Schaffer v. Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 41, 45 (D. Conn. 1995)
(failure to address issues of applying caps to individuals proves no Congressional
intent for individual liability); Vodde v. Indiana Mich. Power Co., 852 F. Supp.
676, 680-81 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (degree of individual liability based upon size of
employer would not have been intended by Congress); Lowry v. Clark, 843 F.
Supp. 228,231 (E.D. Ky. 1994) (compensatory damage limits based on employer
size indicates Congressional intent against recovery from an individual).
141 Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993).
146 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(n) (Supp. V 1993).
147 Id. § 2000e(b) (1988).
148 Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 424 n.7 (D.N.J. 1994).
149 Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (N.D. Ill.
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C. Congress Did Not Intend the Inclusion of the Agent Provision
Merely to Incorporate Respondeat Superior Liability into the
Statute
The Miller court attempted to explain away the agent provision as
simply incorporating respondeat superior liability into the statute.5 '
This explanation was expanded by the court in Vodde v. Indiana
Michigan Power Co.' when it said that Title VII includes the agent
provision because "it underscores the notion that the employer is to have
some derivative liability for the deliberate discriminatory acts of its
employees.' 52 The court in Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp.,53
read the agency provision in the ADEA as "an unremarkable expression
of respondeat superior" which meant "that discriminatory personnel
actions taken by an employer's agent may create liability for the
employer."' 5
4
However, these courts are reading too much into the statute. There
was no need for Congress to specifically provide for respondeat superior
liability as it is already built into the statute. Since a corporation or
organization can act only through its agents, the very "prohibition against
discrimination by 'an employer' necessarily embodies respondeat superior
principles on its own.' 55 In fact, the United States Supreme Court
recognized this when it observed that "the courts have consistently held
employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by
supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew, should have
known, or approved of the supervisor's actions."' 56 Furthermore,
agency principles hold that "[a] master is subject to liability for the torts
of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employ-
ment."'
57
It seems clear that Congress could not have intended merely to
incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute by the inclusion
of the agent provision because respondeat superior liability is already
present. As one court noted, it would be a "peculiarly odd congressional
1994).
50 Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
151 852 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
152 Id. at 679.
11 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994).
154 Id. at 510.
'5- Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1995).
156 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986).
157 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
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choice of language if Congress' purpose was merely to impose respondeat
superior liability." ' 8 In fact, if Congress's intention had been to
incorporate respondeat superior liability, there were better ways to
accomplish that goal. This was explained by the court in Cassano v.
DeSoto,159 when it asked: "[I]f that really were Congress' limited
intention, it surely chose an odd and roundabout way of doing so - why
would it enact a provision that defined such employees as 'agents'
coming within the definition of 'employer,' instead of including a direct
statement of respondeat superior liability in the statute?" 6'
Reading the agent provision to merely incorporate respondeat superior
liability into the statute when that liability is present naturally "reduces
the agent clause to surplusage." '' This was explained further:
Absent this clause, Title VII would nevertheless permit respondeat
superior liability against employers for the acts of their agents under
common law liability principles. Indeed, respondeat superior liability is
so fundamental to the employment context that the term "employer" is
commonly defined to include acting on the employer's behalf. 62
There is no good reason to assume that Congress intended to insert
that which was already included. Consequently, the inclusion of the agent
provision must mean something more than imposing respondeat superior
liability. That something more can only be that Congress intended the
individual agents of those who have more than fourteen employees to be
liable for their own discriminatory acts.163
D. Agency Principles Do Not Allow the Individual Agent to Escape
Liability
Since Congress included the agent provision in the definition of
employer, there can be no question "that Congress wanted courts to look
158 Schallehn v. Central Trust & Say. Bank, 877 F. Supp. 1315, 1333 n.15
(N.D. Iowa 1995).
159 860 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
160 Id. at 539. Accord Schallehn, 877 F. Supp. at 1333 n.15; Jendusa v.
Cancer Treatment Ctrs., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (quoting
Desoto, 860 F. Supp. at 539).
161 Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1319 (2d Cir. 1995) (Parker, J.,
dissenting).
162 Id.
163 Id.
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to agency principles for guidance in this area."'" Several courts have
followed the Supreme Court's lead and utilized agency principles to
determine whether a supervisor may be held individually liable for
discriminatory conduct. 6
Agency is defined as "the fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act
on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to
act."' 66 Although this definition obviously includes employees, especial-
ly supervisory employees, it is broader than that.
Agency principles further hold that an agent is not immune from
liability simply because of his or her status as an agent.'67 The only
exceptions which would relieve the agent from liability are when (1) "he
is exercising a privilege of the principal;" (2) he is exercising a "privilege
held by him for the protection of the principal's interests;" or (3) "the
principal owes no duty or less than the normal duty of care to the person
harmed.'
6 8
Nothing in this principle appears to allow an agent of an employer
under Title VII to escape liability. The principal (the employer) certainly
possesses no privilege to discriminate which can be exercised by the
agent. Furthermore, the agent possesses no privilege to discriminate to
protect the employer's interests. Finally, the principal owes a duty to not
discriminate and that duty cannot be ignored by the agent.
A final agency principle notes: 'Trincipal and agent can be joined in
one action for a wrong resulting from the tortious conduct of an agent or
that of agent and principal, and a judgment can issue against each.' ' 69
Applying this agency principle to Title VII, it becomes clear that
' Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). However, the
Supreme Court did note that agency principles might not be applicable to Title
VII in their entirety. Id.
165 Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
company liable for age discrimination by its supervisory employee as an agent);
Jendusav. CancerTreatment Ctrs., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1012-13 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(surveying relevant discrimination case where agency principles used); Griffith
v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 858 F. Supp. 802, 806 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (citing
Supreme Court's endorsement of use of agency principles).
166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958). Subsection (2)
defines the "principal" as "[t]he one for whom action is to be taken" and
subsection (3) defines the agent as "[t]he one who is to act."
167 Id. § 343.
168 Id.
169 I/d. § 359C(1).
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individual employees who qualify as agents of larger employers can be
held individually liable along with the larger employer and each can have
compensatory and punitive damages issued against them. In fact, in some
instances, agency principles require that judgment issue against the agent
because "[i]f the action is based solely upon the tortious conduct of the
agent, a judgment on the merits for the agent and against the principal,
or a smaller judgment for compensatory damages against the agent than
against the principal, is erroneous.""17 In many discrimination cases the
action is indeed based solely upon the conduct of the agent and at least
the spirit of agency principles would be circumvented by allowing the
agent to escape individual liability.
E. A Finding of No Individual Liability Could Allow Many Instances
of Discrimination to Go Unpunished and Could Preclude
Plaintiffs from Obtaining a Remedy
An additional reason to impose individual liability under Title VII is
that otherwise many instances of discrimination will go unpunished and
undeterred and deserving plaintiffs may be left without a realistic remedy.
If the defendant company is bankrupt or otherwise unable to pay any
judgment, the plaintiff may be left without a remedy absent individual
liability. Such a situation occurred in Falbaum v. Pomerantz."' The
employer in that case, a clothing manufacturer, was in bankruptcy
proceedings.72 Consequently, five former employees filed suit against
four current employees and the company's outside counsel as individuals
for age discrimination.'73 After finding that the individuals could not be
held personally liable under the statute, the court said that the employees
were not without recourse because "[i]f an employer is engaged in
bankruptcy proceedings, an aggrieved employee may seek relief in the
bankruptcy court, as plaintiffs in this case have done."'74
Although such plaintiffs could technically seek relief from a bankrupt
employer, that remedy is not very realistic. It is far more likely that such
plaintiffs will receive nothing. This was apparently recognized by a court
in the same district as the Falbaum court when it limited its finding of no
individual liability to situations in which "a solvent organizational party
170 Id. § 359C(2).
'' 891 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
172 Id. at 987.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 991.
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is liable for any acts done on its behalf."'175 The problem of a bankrupt
employer was also recognized by the court in EEOC v. AIC Security
Investigations.'76 However, while recognizing that such employees will
be without a remedy, the court stated that was "not enough for us to
upset the structure Congress has set up.
177
Admittedly, in most situations, individual liability is not of great
consequence to a plaintiff because the institutional employer is still liable.
However, in those cases where the plaintiff must seek recovery from
supervisory employees if he or she is to gain any recovery at all it makes
a very big difference. As the court noted in Vakharia v. Swedish
Covenant Hospital, "if the people who make discriminatory decisions do
not have to pay for them, they may never alter their illegal behavior and
the wrongdoers may elude punishment entirely, while the victim may
receive no compensation whatsoever."
178
An additional problem occurs when an institutional employer is found
not liable for the agent's conduct. This most frequently occurs in sexual
harassment cases. As seen above, a corporate employer can escape
liability in sexual harassment cases if the response is "adequate and
effective."' 79 A further example of this was provided in Lynam v. Foot
First Podiatry Centers.'80 The plaintiffs sued the corporate employer
and individuals for sexual harassment. The court remained convinced that
individual liability under Title VII was essential, but was compelled to
find no individual liability due to the Seventh Circuit's holding in EEOC
v. AIC Security Investigations.181 The court predicted that the corporate
defendants would undoubtedly argue that the sexually harassing conduct
occurred outside the scope of the supervisors' authority and that they
were consequently not liable."8 2 The court observed that if that hap-
pened, then the victims would be left without relief and the objectives of
Title VII, deterrence and securing justice for victims, would be subvert-
ed.1
83
17s Bramesco v. Drug Computer Consultants, 834 F. Supp. 120, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). The court held that there could be no individual liability
where no unique claims are brought against the individual and no other
special circumstances exist. Id.
176 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
177 Id. at 1282 n.9.
,71 824 F. Supp. 769, 786 (N.D. Il. 1993).
179 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
,8' 886 F. Supp. 1443 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
18 Id. at 1446. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
182 Lynam, 886 F. Supp. at 1447.
183 Id.
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A similar situation occurred in Williams v. Banning.184 The plaintiff
in that case did not even attempt to sue her corporate employer,
apparently realizing that such action would be, as the court of appeals
said, "futile.' ' 85 Although the issue of the employer's liability was not
before the court, it stated that the company's "prompt action constitutes
all the redress to which Williams is entitled under Title VII.' ' 86 The
court also declared: "This is precisely the result Title VII was meant to
achieve."' 7 The court also proposed that the plaintiff could turn to
traditional tort remedies for additional compensation, suggesting that
Congress intended such remedies be used.1
88
At least two courts have recognized this possibility in holding that
there is no individual liability under Title VII. In Lowry v. Clark,'89 the
court said: "A mere showing that a plaintiff may be without a federal
remedy, however, cannot support imposing Title VII liability if the statute
does not create such liability. 9 The court in Redpath v. City of Over-
land Park9' was slightly more sympathetic when it similarly acknowl-
edged that "this limitation regrettably may leave some victims of
employment discrimination without any meaningful remedy, but it [the
court] cannot impose liability where Congress has chosen not to do
so."' However, these courts summarily dismissed the notion of a
plaintiff being left without a remedy because they had already decided
that there was no liability. 3
In a similar vein, the court in Johnson v. University Surgical Group
Associates' addressed the suggestion that a plaintiff could sue a
114 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995).
185 Id. at 555.
186 Id.
117 Id. However, this statement largely ignores the goals and objectives which
the United States Supreme Court has held Title VII was designed to achieve. See
infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
188 Id. However, one of the objectives of Title VII itself is to provide
compensation. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. There does not seem
to be any reason to assume that Congress intended compensatory remedies to be
used in lieu of the ones provided by Title VII. See infra notes 194-95 and
accompanying text.
189 843 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Ky. 1994).
190 Id. at 231.
'9' 857 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Kan. 1994).
192 Id. at 1456 n.10.
193 Supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
194 871 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
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supervisor directly under a common law tort, such as battery. The court
said that while that may be true, it is beside the point because "[t]he
purpose of Title VII is to protect workers from certain kinds of prejudi-
cial treatment on the job, not to federalize common law torts."'95
F. The Purposes of Title VII Are Thwarted Without a Finding of
Individual Liability
When it enacted Title VII, Congress's goal was "the elimination of
discrimination in the workplace."' 96 The United States Supreme Court
has remarked that "Congress designed the remedial measures in these
statutes to serve as a 'spur or catalyst' to cause employers 'to self-
examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor
to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges' of discrimination." '197
The Supreme Court has held in several cases that two objectives are
served by antidiscrimination statutes: (1) deterrence, and (2) compensation
for injuries caused by the discrimination. 9 ' Furthermore, the private
litigant who pursues a discrimination suit "not only redresses his own
injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against
discriminatory employment practices."'99
Each of these goals advanced by Title VII is thwarted by disallowing
individual liability. The goal of compensation is frustrated when a
corporate defendant is bankrupt or not liable for the conduct.200 The
accomplishment of the goal of eliminating discriminatory conduct has
been more hotly debated.
The theory that the goal of deterrence is best served by finding
individual liability focuses upon the likelihood that individuals who are
never held accountable or liable for their conduct will not be deterred and
will continue to engage in the discriminatory conduct. The Miller court
dismissed that theory because employers are still liable.2"'
19' Id. at 986.
196 See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1974).
1 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884
(1995) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
'98 See, e.g., MeKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884; Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418
(1975).
199 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974).
200 See supra notes 171-95 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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A number of courts agree with Miller in its analysis on this argument.
For example, one such court said simply that "[e]mployer liability ensures
that no employee can violate the civil rights laws with impunity
..... 202 This logic was explained more fully in Johnson v. Northern
Indiana Public Service Co.2 3 The court observed: "It may be presumed
that employers do not wish to employ supervisors who discriminate and
subject their employers to liability."' 4 The court further characterized
this potential for termination as an "effective deterrent. 20 5
The court in EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations2M6 took notice of
the plaintiff's argument that "the paramount consideration is stamping out
discrimination and that through the loophole of no individual liability will
pour a flood of unpunished and undeterrable discrimination. 2M7 Howev-
er, the court rejected that argument as "Chicken Little-esque" in light of
the continuing liability of the employing entity and its incentives to
adequately discipline employees who discriminate z.2 ' Another court
observed that the legislative history of Title VII envisioned such a
deterrent effect on the employers rather than on individuals.
2 9
Another court advanced the idea that "the employer will be acutely
sensitive to any suggestion of discrimination and will be committed to its
eradication." ' That court held that the "deep-pocketed and publicity-
conscious employer (in general contrast to the ordinary supervisory
employee bent on pursuing some private agenda) can be counted upon to
be the most effective guardian of the marketplace."'
However, these courts have ignored the broader goals of Title VII.
Title VII does not merely have the goal of finding the single most
effective way of eradicating workplace discrimination. Its goals are
simply to completely eradicate employment discrimination by deterring
202 Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994).
203 844 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
204 Id. at 469.
205 Id.
206 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).
207 Id. at 1282.
208 Id.
209 Marshall v. Miller, 873 F. Supp. 628, 631 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. at 69-70 (1991) (quoting Dr. Fraeda
Klein), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 607-08).
210 Vodde v. Indiana Mich. Power Co., 852 F. Supp. 676, 681 (N.D. Ind.
1994).
211 Id.
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the conduct and compensating victims of discrimination.212 These goals
were dismissed by the court in Hudson v. Soft Sheen Products."3 That
court said that it "cannot reverse course in the face of some vague,
aspirational broad intent."2 4 That argument was directly answered by
the court in Lynam v. Foot First Podiatry Centers. 215 The court ob-
served that perhaps such a statement dismissed the broad remedial
purposes and objectives of antidiscrimination statutes too easily.216 The
court asserted that "[w]here such critical issues as race, gender, and
disability discrimination - which are inextricably interconnected with this
Nation's history of disturbed race and gender relations - are presented
to the court, we believe that the broad aspirational goals of Congress, at
the very least, ought not to be disregarded."217
An excellent analysis of why individual liability is necessary to
effectuate the deterrent purposes of Title VII is provided in Jendusa v.
Cancer Treatment Centers.21 The court began with the proposition that
individual liability is essential if the antidiscrimination statutes are to have
their full deterrent effect.219 The court rejects the notion that deterrence
will function "through indirect reliance on the marketplace assumptions
concerning the actions of rational economic actors/employers after
incurring a civil penalty .... .22 0 The court very logically reasoned that
failing to hire or promote the most qualified candidate for discriminatory
reasons is not rational economic action, yet it is the very conduct which
motivated Congress to enact Title VII.22' Consequently, the court found
it "inconceivable... that Congress intended to delegate the deterrence
function of these statutes to the rational economic actors in the market-
place. 2
22
212 See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
213 873 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
214 Id. at 136. That statementwas cited with approval by the Seventh Circuit
in EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
215 886 F. Supp. 1443 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
216 Id. at 1447.
217 rd.
218 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. IIl. 1994).
219 Id. at 1011.
220 Id.
221 Id. This reasoning is further supported by a decision that found
the employer a sufficient deterrent, despite the fact that an employee may be
"bent on pursuing some private agenda." See supra note 211 and accompanying
text.
222 Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1011.
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The Jendusa court also rejected the Miller court's suggestion that
deterrence will occur because liable employers will discipline wayward
employees. The Jendusa court reasonably suggested that frequently,
employers who lose a discrimination suit leave the courthouse feeling
they have been done an injustice at the hands of a jury sympathetic to the
plaintiff.223 Consequently, these employers will feel they did nothing
wrong and will not automatically terminate or discipline the offending
employee.22
4
G. The Necessity of Individual Liability Is Particularly Compelling
in Sexual Harassment Suits
The need for individual liability to fully realize the goals of Title VII
is even more urgent in cases of sexual harassment. Although respondeat
superior liability may hold a corporate employer liable for the harassing
acts of its employees, that liability is not absolute.22' Liability of a
corporate employer can be rebutted if "adequate and effective action is
taken. ' 26 This action often consists of terminating or otherwise disci-
plining the offending employee.227 However, even if termination halts
a particular offender's conduct in that place of employment, that action
does not fully compensate the victim. Relieving a corporate employer
from liability while denying recovery against the individual offender
deprives victims of sexual harassment of the full range of remedies which
Congress intended.
Furthermore, a lack of individual liability will not provide full
deterrence to those who engage in sexual harassment. Congress imple-
mented Title VII as a catalyst for self-evaluation of employment
practices. 28 An individual is naturally more likely to examine his or her
conduct and refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct if he or she faces
a lawsuit in addition to termination of employment. Consequently,
223 Id. at 1012.
224 Id.
22. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
226 Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 185 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1401 (1992).
227 Termination was deemed sufficient in Kauffman. Such action was also
sufficient in Reed v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 93-5031, 1994 WL 56930, at *4
(6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 190 (1994).
228 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884
(1995) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
1332 [Vol. 84
TILE VII
individual liability is necessary for Title VII to have its full deterrent
effect.22
9
CONCLUSION
In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress was attempting to
eradicate discrimination from the workplace. In the thirty years since
Title VII's original enactment, Congress has twice amended the Act to
expand its scope and better achieve its twin objectives of compensating
victims of employment discrimination and deterring discriminatory
conduct. Despite the fact that these objectives are better achieved by
allowing individual liability under Title VII, courts persist in reading Title
VII as not contemplating such liability. Congress included agents in the
definition of employer for a reason and a strict reading of the statute
leads to the conclusion that agents of persons who employ more than
fourteen people, along with corporate employers, are liable for violations
of Title VII. 2 ' Furthermore, despite the insistence by some courts that
Congress intended to protect small entities from the costs of litigation, the
legislative history of Title VII shows that Congress was more interested
in protecting small businesses because of the way they are run, keeping
in mind their huge impact on the economy.23" ' Additionally, the purpose
of including "agents" in the definition of "employer" could not have been
merely to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute because
employers have always been held responsible for the acts of their
employees taken in the scope of their employment 3 2 If Congress had
really wanted to emphasize the existence of respondeat superior liability,
it is more logical to think that it would have included a direct statement
holding corporate employers liable under Title VII for the acts of their
employees.233 This reasoning becomes even more persuasive when it is
realized that established agency principles do not allow the agent to
escape liability even when the principal is held liable and judgment is not
limited to one or the other.234
In light of Congress's twin goals of compensating victims and
deterring discrimination, individual liability is vital to eradicate discrimi-
"' Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1011 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
2 See supra notes 114-34 and accompanying text.
23 See supra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
3 Cassano v. DeSoto, 860 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (N.D. Il. 1994).
234 See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
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nation from the workplace. In many cases a victimized plaintiff is left
without a remedy because a corporate employer is either unable to pay
a judgment or is not liable. 1 5 Furthermore, individuals who are immune
from liability for their actions have no real incentive to cease the activity.
Although many courts assert that the liable corporate employer will deter
the discrimination through discipline of employees, that marketplace
argument is at best speculation. 36
Obviously, the question of individual liability under Title VII is best
answered either by Congress through another amendment to the statute
or by the United States Supreme Court through a definitive interpretation
of who is an "employer" under the statute. However, in the meantime, the
goals of Title VII are best effectuated by allowing individual liability.
Individual liability is necessary so that victims of discrimination, like
Lucille Kauffman, who are precluded from proceeding in a sexual
harassment claim against a corporate employer who takes "adequate and
effective" action,2 37 can recover damages from the person who actually
engaged in the harassment. Otherwise, victims of discrimination in the
workplace, and victims of sexual harassment in particular, may be left
without the compensatory and punitive damages Congress intended them
to have.
Kendra Samson
,, See supra notes 171-95 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 201-24 and accompanying text.
237 Kaufmann v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 185 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1041 (1992).
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